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38		 Adjudication	and	Justification:	To	What	Extent	Should	the	Excluded	Be	Included	in	the	Judge’s	Decision?		 BART	VAN	KLINK	
Vrije	Universiteit	Amsterdam,	The	Netherlands	
B.van.Klink@vu.nl			 As	 follows	 from	 the	Rule	 of	 Law,	 the	 judge	has	 to	 justify	 her	decision.	In	contemporary	legal	and	social	theory,	it	is	argued	that	 she	 should	 somehow	give	 recognition	 to	 arguments	 and	viewpoints	that	have	been	excluded	from	the	final	decision.	In	my	paper,	I	will	address	the	question	why,	to	what	extent	and	in	 what	 way	 the	 judge	 has	 to	 give	 recognition	 to	 the	arguments	 and	 viewpoints	 that	 she	 has	 excluded	 from	 her	decision.			 KEYWORDS:	Arendt,	 authority,	 decisionism,	 decision-making,	jurisprudence,	 legal	 argumentation,	 Luhmann,	 rule	 of	 law,	Schmitt,	system	theory			1.	THE	BURDEN	OF	RATIONALITY		Adjudication	is	about	deciding.	Two	(or	more)	parties	quarrel	over	the	right	interpretation	of	the	law	and	by	appealing	to	a	judge,	they	give	her	the	authority	 to	determine	 the	 law’s	meaning,	 at	 least	 temporarily,	 for	the	case	at	hand.	However,	adjudication	 is	not	 just	about	deciding.	Not	every	decision	will	do:	the	judge’s	decision,	including	the	way	in	which	it	 is	 reached	 and	 how	 it	 is	 justified,	 has	 to	 meet	 some	 standard	 of	rationality.	As	Lon	L.	Fuller,	1978,	p.	380,	argues,	“adjudication	is	a	form	of	 social	 ordering	 institutionally	 committed	 to	 ‘rational’	 decision.”	 He	even	 believes	 that,	 compared	 to	 other	 forms	 of	 social	 ordering,	adjudication	carries	the	heaviest	burden	of	rationality:			 Adjudication	 is,	 then,	 a	 device	 which	 gives	 formal	 and	institutional	expression	to	the	influence	of	reasoned	argument	in	 human	 affairs.	 As	 such	 it	 assumes	 a	 burden	 of	 rationality	not	 borne	 by	 any	 other	 form	 of	 social	 ordering.	 A	 decision	
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644	 which	is	the	product	of	reasoned	argument	must	be	prepared	itself	to	meet	the	test	of	reason.1				The	question	is	why	adjudication	has	to	meet	this	severe	test	of	reason	and	when	 it	 can	 be	 said	 to	 have	 passed	 this	 test.	 Interestingly,	 Fuller	puts	 “rational”	 between	 inverted	 commas	 when	 he	 claims	 that	adjudication	 is	 “institutionally	 committed	 to	 ‘rational’	 decision”.	 Could	this	 perhaps	 indicate	 some	 reservation	 on	 his	 side	 towards	 the	supposedly	rational	character	of	adjudication?			It	 may	 be	 questioned	 that	 a	 judge	 should	 justify	 her	 decision	extensively.	One	could	argue	that	by	giving	reasons,	the	judge	does	not	necessarily	 strengthen	 her	 authority,	 but	 could	 also	 weaken	 or	undermine	 it.	 According	 to	 Hannah	 Arendt,	 2006,	 p.	 93,	 authority	excludes	potestas	or	power	(“where	force	is	used,	authority	has	failed”)	as	well	 as	persuasion:	 “Authority	 (…)	 is	 incompatible	with	persuasion,	which	 presupposes	 equality	 and	 works	 through	 a	 process	 of	argumentation.	 Where	 arguments	 are	 used,	 authority	 is	 left	 in	abeyance.”	 By	 giving	 reasons	 authority	 is	 deferred,	 because	 the	acceptance	 of	 authority	 is	 made	 to	 depend	 on	 the	 always	 insecure	outcome	of	persuasion:	the	parties	involved	may	or	may	not	accept	the	arguments	offered	by	the	judge.	In	 our	 Age	 of	 Reason,	 it	 is	 very	 difficult	 to	 accept	 that	adjudication	may	not	be	fully	“rational”.	For	good	reasons,	we	as	citizens	expect	 the	 judge	 to	 give	 good	 reasons	 for	 her	 decision.	 One	 reason	follows	from	the	 indeterminate	quality	of	 the	 law.	The	 law,	necessarily	phrased	 in	 general	 terms,	 can	never	determine	 fully	 its	 application	on	concrete	 cases.	 Inevitably,	 the	 judge	 has	 to	 make	 a	 choice	 among	competing	 interpretations	 –	 a	 choice	which	 cannot	 be	made	 solely	 on	the	basis	of	the	settled	law.	Because	multiple	applications	are	possible,	the	judge	has	to	justify	why	she	favours	one	application	over	the	other.	Other	 reasons	 have	 to	 do	 with	 the	 need	 for	 accountability,	controllability	 and	 predictability:	 the	 parties	 involved	 want	 to	 know	whether	 she	 has	 considered	 their	 arguments	 seriously,	 higher	 judges	must	 be	 able	 to	 assess	 whether	 she	 has	 applied	 the	 law	 correctly,	scholars	 have	 to	 construe	 a	 doctrine	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 various	decisions,	 lawyers	 need	 to	 calculate	 their	 chances	 in	 similar	 future	cases,	and	so	on.	So	some	amount	of	justification	seems	to	be	justified.	To	a	growing	extent,	in	contemporary	social	and	legal	theory	the	burden	 of	 rationality	 that	 rests	 on	 the	 judge	 is	 raised.	 Some	 scholars	have	 argued	 that	 she	 should	 somehow	 give	 more	 recognition	 to	arguments	 and	 viewpoints	 that	 have	 been	 excluded	 from	 the	 final																																									 																					1	Fuller,	1978,	pp.	366-367.	
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decision.	 According	 to	 Luhmann,	 2000	 and	 2005,	 the	 judge	 provides	information	 not	 only	 on	 the	 decision	 itself	 but	 inevitably	 also	 on	 the	solution	rejected,	why	this	constitutes	an	alternative	and	no	alternative	at	 the	 same	 time.	 Following	 Luhmann,	 Fischer-Lescano	&	Christensen,	2005,	 claim	 that	 in	 the	 judge’s	 decision	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 different	solution	should	be	kept	open.	By	giving	recognition	to	all	arguments	put	forward	 by	 the	 parties	 involved,	 the	 decision	 would	 lose	 some	 of	 its	violent	character.	In	my	paper	I	will	address	the	question	why,	to	what	extent	 and	 in	 what	 way	 the	 judge	 has	 to	 give	 recognition	 to	 the	arguments	and	points	of	view	that	she	has	to	exclude	from	her	decision.	Or	 does	 this	 inclusion	 of	 the	 excluded	 undermine	 the	 authority	 of	 the	judge?		I	 will	 defend	 here	 a	 moderate	 decisionist	 position,	 which	acknowledges	that	in	the	final	analysis	the	judge	has	to	take	a	decision	that	aims	at	reaching	legal	closure,	that	is,	at	ending	–	for	the	time	being	and	for	the	case	at	hand	–	the	on-going	discussion	on	the	meaning	of	the	law.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 provides	 some	 room	 for	 reasoning	 and	argumentation,	 albeit	 within	 institutionally	 defined	 and	 defensible	limits.	Below	I	will	address	the	following	three	questions:	in	what	sense	can	 the	 judge’s	 ruling	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 decision?	 (section	 2);	 why	does	adjudication	need	 	any	 justification?	(section	3);	and	what	can	be	reasonably	be	expected	from	a	justification	by	the	judge?	To	what	extent	should	 the	excluded	be	 included	 in	 the	 final	decision?	 (section	4).2	My	aim	is	to	show	that	Fuller	was	right	in	putting	inverted	commas	around	“rational”:	 the	 judge’s	decision	 should	meet	 some	 reasonable	 standard	of	 rationality,	 but	 should	 not	 be	 overburdened	 by	 the	 insatiable	demands	of	Reason.			2.	DECISION	AND	DECISIONISM			The	 concept	 of	 decision	 has	 been	 brought	 into	 discredit	 due	 to	 its	connection	to	decisionism	(see	Lübbe,	1971,	p.	7).	Decisionism	is	usually	seen	 as	 a	 political	 theory	 that	 favours	 an	 authoritarian	 and	 arbitrary	style	of	governance,	more	suited	to	dictatorship	than	to	the	Rule	of	Law.	It	 is	 associated	 with	 Carl	 Schmitt,	 the	 German	 philosopher	 and	 jurist	who,	 for	 a	 short	 period	 of	 time,	worked	 for	 the	Nazi	 regime.3	 Schmitt	himself	 did	 not	 always	 defend	 a	 decisionist	 position.	 In	 one	 of	 his	earliest	works,	Gesetz	und	Urteil	(Law	and	Decision),	originally	published	in	 1912,	 he	 argues	 that	 legal	 practise	 is	 directed	 at	 achieving	 “legal																																									 																					2	This	paper	is	partly	based	on	earlier	publications	on	the	same	topic	in	Dutch	(see,	for	instance,	Van	Klink,	2012).		3	A	short	biography	can	be	found	in	Müller,	2003,	pp.	15-48.		
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646	clarity”	 (“Rechtsbestimmtheit”).4,5	 The	 judge’s	 decision	 has	 to	 be	“foreseeable	and	calculable”	(Schmitt,	1969,	p.	73).	That	does	not	mean	that	 the	 judge	 is	 required	 to	 simply	 apply	 the	 law	 by	 way	 of	subsumption	 –	 that	 is,	 according	 to	 Schmitt,	 no	 longer	 possible	 –,	 but	she	has	to	establish	whether	another	judge	in	the	same	case	would	have	arrived	at	the	same	result:	“A	judge’s	decision	is	nowadays	correct,	if	it	can	 be	 expected	 that	 another	 judge	 would	 have	 decided	 in	 the	 same	way”	 (Schmitt,	1969,	p.	71).	Moreover,	 the	decision	has	 to	be	 justified:	“There	 is	 no	 decision	without	 justification;	 the	 justification	 belongs	 to	the	 decision”	 (Schmitt,	 1969,	 p.	 69).	 In	 the	 justification	 it	 has	 to	 be	explained	why	the	decision	in	the	given	circumstances	is	right.		In	his	 later	work	Schmitt	gives	up	 this	 intersubjective	criterion	for	 the	 correctness	 of	 a	 decision.	Moreover,	 he	 breaks	 the	 connection	which	 he	 previously	 had	 forged	 between	 decision	 and	 justification.	Within	the	context	of	his	theory	of	sovereignty,	 it	 is	the	sovereign	who	decides	on	the	state	of	exception.	By	declaring	the	state	of	exception,	the	sovereign	 suspends	 the	 existing	 legal	 order	 in	 its	 entirety.	 The	sovereign’s	 decision	 is	 a	 subjective	 act	 of	 volition	 that,	 from	 the	perspective	 of	 the	 law,	 seems	 to	 come	 from	 nowhere:	 “Looked	 at	normatively,	 the	 decision	 emanates	 from	nothingness”	 (Schmitt,	 2005,	pp.	31-32).	From	a	legal	point	of	view,	no	grounds	can	be	given	for	the	decision,	since	there	are	no	legal	norms	anymore	that	can	be	applied;	it	is	exactly	the	decision	which	has	to	prepare	the	ground	for	a	return	to	the	 normal	 situation	 where	 it	 is	 possible	 again	 to	 apply	 legal	 norms.	However,	the	exception	appears	to	be	not	that	exceptional.	Also	in	daily	legal	practice	a	decisionist	element	can	be	found	in	the	judge’s	ruling:		 Every	 concrete	 juristic	 decision	 contains	 a	 moment	 of	indifference	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 content,	 because	 the	juristic	 deduction	 is	 not	 traceable	 in	 the	 last	 detail	 to	 its	premises	 and	 because	 the	 circumstance	 that	 requires	 a	decision	remains	an	independently	determining	moment.6			The	general	norms	of	the	law	have	to	be	concretized	or	“transformed”	in	order	 to	 be	 applicable	 to	 a	 concrete	 case.	 This	 “transformation”	presupposes	 an	 “auctoritatis	 interpositio”,	 a	 determination	 of	who	 has	the	authority	 to	decide,	which	cannot	be	derived	 from	the	 legal	norms																																									 																					4	Some	of	the	texts	I	refer	to	in	this	article	are	written	in	German	and	have	not	been	 translated	 into	 English.	Whenever	 I	 quote	 from	 these	 texts	 (like	 in	 this	case),	I	have	made	my	own	translation	(as	indicated).		5	Literally,	“Bestimmtheit”	means	determinateness.	6	Schmitt,	2005,	p.	30,	see	also	Schmitt,	1996,	p.	46.	
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themselves	(Schmitt,	2005,	p.	31);	nor	does	the	law	determine	how	the	authority	 has	 to	 apply	 the	 norms	 at	 hand.	 According	 to	 Schmitt,	 the	decision	 is	 in	 a	 literal	 sense	 a	 “de-cision”	 (“Ent-Scheidung”)	 in	 which	norm	and	fact	which	are	separated	as	much	as	possible	in	the	“ordinary”	legal	order	are	re-united.7	In	his	view,	the	point	of	a	legal	decision	is	not	so	much	to	offer	an	“overwhelming	argumentation”	but	to	take	away	the	doubt	 in	an	authoritarian	way.8	 In	other	words,	 to	acquire	force	of	 law	the	 decision	 does	 not	 have	 to	 rely	 upon	 its	 justification	 or	“substantiation”	(Schmitt,	2005,	p.	32).	Hermann	Lübbe,	a	critical	student	of	Schmitt,	has	tried	to	rescue	the	concept	of	decision,	despite	its	politically	charged	origin,	for	political	theory.	 He	 develops	 a	 decisionist	 position	 that	 does	 not	 result	 in	 a	defense	 of	 authoritarian	 or	 down-right	 dictatorial	 ruling.	 He	 accuses	Schmitt	 and	 his	 followers	 –	 whom	 he,	 not	 without	 irony,	 calls	 the	“Romanticists	of	the	state	of	exception”9	–	that	they	have	created	a	false	opposition	 between	 “real	 life”	 and	 the	 daily	 legal	 practice	 based	 on	routine.	According	to	Lübbe,	ordinary	life	also	consists	of	extraordinary	circumstances	 and	 decisive	 moments	 in	 which	 decisions	 have	 to	 be	taken.	In	the	course	of	history,	due	to	the	erosion	of	common	traditions,	human	existence	has	increasingly	become	decisionist	in	character.	That	is,	 to	 a	 growing	 extent,	modern	man	 lives	 under	 the	 pressure	 to	 take	decisions.	 A	 decision	 is	 a	 choice	 one	 feels	 oneself	 compelled	 to	 make	between	two	incompatible	options.	Only	one	of	the	possible	options	can	be	 realized,	 so	 the	 other	 option	 has	 to	 be	 excluded.	 There	 are	 no	“decisive”	 grounds	 available	 to	 make	 a	 well-founded	 choice	 between	both	 alternatives.	 That	 does	 not	 mean,	 however,	 that	 the	 decision	 is	irrational:							
																																								 																					7	 According	 to	 Schmitt,	 1934,	 p.	 18,	 in	 the	 normativist	 variant	 of	 legal	positivism,	facts	and	norms	are	separated	in	the	most	rigorous	way.		8	Schmitt,	1996,	p.	46	(my	translation).	9	 Schmitt	 never	 gets	 tired	 of	 blaming	 his	 liberal	 opponents	 to	 hold	 on	 to	 the	romantic	 ideal	 of	 the	 “eternal	 conversation”:	 instead	of	 taking	decisions,	 they	rather	prefer	 to	 start	 a	debate	 (see,	 for	 instance,	 his	polemic	 against	political	romanticism	 in	 Schmitt,	 1925).	 Lübbe,	 1971,	 p.	 29,	 counters	 this	 criticism	by	pointing	 out	 matter-of-factly	 that	 politicians	 in	 liberal	 democracies	 do	 take	decisions,	albeit	in	another	way	than	a	dictator	would	do.	
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648	 The	 decision	 transcends	 a	 lack	 of	 rational	 determining	grounds	 for	 action.	 It	 is	 not,	 for	 that	 reason,	 irrational.	 The	rationality10	of	the	situation	of	deciding	resides	exactly	 in	the	fact	that	one	determines	a	course	of	action,	although	there	are	no	sufficient	reasons	to	act	in	one	way	and	only	in	this	way.11			The	situation	in	which	one	has	to	decide	always	is	a	state	of	exception,	because	 shared	 standards	 drawn	 from	 law,	 morality,	 tradition,	 public	opinion	 and	 so	 on	 do	 no	 longer	 offer	 enough	 guidance	 and,	 therefore,	one	 is	 left	 to	 one’s	 own	 judgment	 (Lübbe,	 1971,	 p.	 21).	 The	 authority	who	 has	 to	 take	 a	 decision,	 has	 to	 carry	 herself	 the	 “weight	 of	 the	exception.”12	Likewise,	the	judge’s	 judgment	can	be	understood	as	a	decision	in	 this	 sense.	 Building	 on	 Oakeshott’s	 conception	 of	 the	 Rule	 of	 Law	(Oakeshott,	 1975	 and	 1999),	 I	 consider	 it	 to	 be	 her	 task	 to	 assess	whether	the	actions	in	a	specific	case	are	in	accordance	with	the	general	conditions	set	by	the	law.	The	judge	does	not	evaluate	these	conditions	–	 that	 is	 up	 to	 the	 legislature	 –,	 but	 primarily	 deals	with	 their	 correct	application	on	the	case	at	hand.	The	general	norms	of	the	law	are	never	directly	applicable	on	the	case;	there	are	no	easy	cases	in	which	the	law	is	 simply	given.	The	relation	between	 the	 judge’s	 ruling	and	 the	 law	 is	contingent,	 that	 is,	 multiple	 applications	 are	 always	 possible.	 Every	application	 of	 a	 higher	 legal	 norm	 necessarily	 gives	 the	 judge	 to	 a	greater	 or	 lesser	 extents	 freedom.	 Inevitably,	 adjudication	 involves	choosing.	 The	 settled	 law	 does	 limit	 the	 freedom	 to	 choose,	 but	 can	never	take	it	away	entirely.	The	 judge	has	to	make	a	choice	among	the	various	options	 that	 the	 law	offers	 and	 this	 choice	 cannot	be	made	on	the	basis	 of	 the	 settled	 law	 itself.	 There	 is	 no	 established	method	 that	can	 produce	 “one	 right	 answer”	 for	 the	 case	 at	 hand.13	 From	 the	perspective	of	 the	settled	 law,	as	Hans	Kelsen,	1994,	p.	96,	argues,	 the	various	possible	decisions	are	of	equal	value,	because	the	choice	among	them	 is	 based	 on	 a	 subjective	 evaluation	 from	 another	 normative,	 for	instance	moral	or	political,	point	of	view.	In	the	moment	of	decision,	the	judge	finds	herself	in	the	state	of	exception	as	described	by	Lübbe:	with																																									 																					10	 In	 German	 “Vernunft,”	 which,	 among	 other	 things,	 also	 refers	 to	 reason,	intellectual	power	or	capacity.	11	Lübbe,	1971,	p.	21	(my	translation).	12	This	expression	is	taken	from	Heidbrink,	2007,	p.	178	(my	translation).	13	Also	Dworkin,	who	defends	 the	 famous	 “one	 right	 answer	 thesis”	 (see,	 e.g.,	Dworkin,	1978,	pp.	279-290)	does	not	offer	a	method	of	that	kind.	His	appeal	to	general	 legal	principles	makes	 it	 even	harder,	 if	not	 impossible,	 to	arrive	at	a	univocal	determination	of	the	law’s	content	in	a	specific	case.		
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no	 generally	 shared,	 unequivocal	 standards	 at	 her	 disposal,	 she	 is	 the	one	who	has	to	take	the	decision	and	carry	its	weight	on	her	own.			3.	DECISION	AND	JUSTIFICATION		Inevitably,	 the	 judge	 has	 to	 take	 a	 decision.	 However,	 that	 does	 not	imply	 by	 necessity	 that	 she	 does	 not	 have	 to	 offer	 reasons	 for	 her	decision.	On	the	contrary,	one	could	argue,	if	the	law	allows	for	multiple	applications,	 she	 has	 to	 justify	 why	 she	 prioritizes	 one	 possible	application	over	 the	other.	There	 is	not	much	 to	explain	when	 the	 law	would	 dictate	 univocally	 one	 right	 answer.	 In	 our	 modern	 age,	adjudication	is	no	longer	seen	as	a	matter	of	sheer	subsumption	(as	if	it	ever	 was)	 but	 it	 is	 commonly	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 judge	 has	nowadays	to	a	greater	or	lesser	extent	discretion	when	interpreting	the	law.	In	the	decision,	the	subjectivity	of	the	subject	who	decides	comes	to	the	fore	more	and	more	explicitly.	According	to	the	German	sociologist	Ludger	 Heidbrink,	 2007,	 this	 is	 due	 to	 the	 erosion	 of	 our	 normative	orders.	Normative	 orders,	 such	 as	 law	or	morality,	 do	not	 have	 a	 self-evident	 validity	 anymore	 and	 their	 norm	 content	 is	 increasingly	uncertain	and	indeterminate.	As	a	result,	the	subject	who	has	to	decide,	is	 forced	 to	 find	 a	 justification	 on	 her	 own	 and	 within	 herself.	 As	Heidbrink	argues:			 The	 loss	 of	 traditional	 orientations,	 the	 decay	 of	 moral	certainties	 and	 the	 erosion	 of	 social	 norms	 and	 rules	 have	contributed	 to	 the	 situation	 in	 which	 the	 individual	 human	being	is	forced	to	justify	his	actions	and	decisions	from	within	himself	 (“aus	 sich	 heraus”)	 and	 to	 implement	 them	 into	practice.14		In	 the	 absence	 of	 shared	 norms	 prescribing	 clear	 duties,	 one	 needs	 a	justification:	“Justification	does	matter	in	particular	in	situations	where	the	 validity,	 the	 determinateness	 and	 the	 information	 content	 have	changed,	 where	 perfect	 duties	 are	 transformed	 into	 imperfect	obligations”	(Heidbrink,	2007,	pp.	77-78;	my	translation).	The	growing	need	 for	 justification	 is,	 therefore,	 caused	by	 the	 increased	 complexity	and	 insecurity	 in	 modern	 society,	 both	 on	 a	 normative	 level	 (which	norms	are	valid?)	and	a	cognitive	level	(how	do	the	valid	norms	have	to	be	applied?).	Decision	 and	 justification	 are	 thus	 no	 contrary	 concepts,	 as	decisionism	 in	 its	 most	 radical	 form	 seems	 to	 suggest,	 but	 are																																									 																					14	Heidbrink,	2007,	p.	182.	
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650	inextricably	 linked:	exactly	because	on	has	 to	decide,	one	has	 to	 justify	oneself.	 At	 the	 same,	 an	 uneasy	 paradox	 occurs:	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	generally	valid	standards,	the	subject	 increasingly	has	to	 justify	herself	and	yet,	again	due	to	the	lack	of	generally	valid	standards,	she	has	less	and	less	means	at	her	disposal	to	do	so	in	a	persuasive	way.	According	to	Heidbrink,	 2007,	 p.	 114	 (my	 translation)	 justification	 becomes	 to	 a	growing	 extent	 an	 “Atopia”	 or	 a	 “non-place”	 which	 “can	 no	 longer	 be	located,	localized	or	captured.”15	Niklas	Luhmann,	1995,	also	assumes	that	the	application	of	law	is	not	or	not	only	a	cognitive	operation.	In	most	cases,	the	law	applicable	in	a	specific	case	cannot	easily	be	deduced	from	the	legal	text.	Since	the	legal	text	fails	to	provide	unequivocal	answers,	often	additional	sources	of	information	such	as	principles	are	invoked	(like	in	Dworkin’s	theory	of	 interpretation,	 see	 e.g.	 Dworkin,	 1978).	 However,	 principles	 of	 law	and	morality	neither	produce	one	 right	answers.	 In	a	pluralist	 society,	as	 Luhmann	 argues,	 conceptions	 of	 justice	 differ	 fundamentally	 so	justice	 cannot	 decide	 upon	 a	 conflict	 between	 competing	 principles.	Therefore,	the	settled	law	cannot	be	conceived	of	without	the	concept	of	decision:	 “The	 concept	of	positivity	 suggests	 that	 it	 can	be	understood	through	the	concept	of	decision.	Positive	law	is	supposed	to	be	validated	through	 decisions”	 (Luhmann,	 2004,	 p.	 76).	 Although	 law’s	 validity	 is	based	on	decisions,	 Luhmann	dismisses	 any	 suggestion	of	 decisionism	in	law:			 This	 leads	 to	 the	 charge	 of	 “decisionism”	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 a	possibility	to	decide	in	an	arbitrary	fashion,	dependent	only	on	the	 coercive	 force	 behind	 such	 decisions.	 Thus,	 this	 leads	 in	fact	 to	 a	 dead-end;	 after	 all,	 everybody	 knows	 that	 in	 law	decisions	are	never	simply	made	arbitrarily.16			According	 to	 Luhmann,	 2000,	 p.	 134,	 the	 decision	 has	 to	 be	accompanied	 by	 a	 justification	 in	 which	 it	 is	 explained	 that	 whoever	takes	 the	decision	either	has	 the	right	or	 the	authority	or	good	reason	for	deciding	in	the	way	she	has	decided.	In	the	justification	information	has	to	be	provided	not	only	about	the	decision	itself,	but	also	about	the	non-chosen	 option	 –	 why	 it	 constitutes	 simultaneously	 an	 alternative	and	no	alternative.17	By	doing	so,	the	authority	gives	herself	or	another																																									 																					15	 Original	 text:	 “sie	 lässt	 sich	 nicht	 mehr	 verorten,	 eingrenzen,	 dingfest	machen.”	16	Luhmann,	2004,	p.	76.	17	The	original	 text	 runs	 as	 follows:	 “Die	Entscheidung	muss	über	 sich	 selbst,	aber	dann	auch	noch	über	die	Alternative	informieren,	also	über	das	Paradox,	
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authority	the	opportunity	to	reconsider	the	decision	and	to	include	the	excluded	 alternative.	 So	 in	 Luhmann’s	 view	 decision	 and	 justification	are	necessarily	connected:	because	one	could	have	decided	otherwise18	(and	will	do	so	in	the	future),	one	has	to	justify	oneself.	Building	 on	 Luhmann’s	 systems	 theory	 as	 well	 as	 Derrida’s	deconstructivism,	 Fischer-Lescano	 &	 Christensen,	 2005,	 reject	 the	decisionist	 approach	 as	 advocated	 by	 Schmitt.	 They	 accuse	 Schmitt	 of	having	 misrepresented	 the	 decision	 as	 a	 purely	 subjective	 act	 which	takes	 place	 in	 splendid	 isolation,	 as	 a	 creation	 from	nowhere.	 In	 their	view,	the	decision	by	the	judge	is	part	of	a	social	communication	process	that	 does	 not	 end	with	 the	 decision;	 on	 the	 contrary,	 it	 continues	 the	communication	 process.	 The	 judge’s	 decision	 is	 a	 suspension	(“Aufschub”)	 rather	 than	 a	 determination	 of	 law:	 “The	 law	 does	 not	terminate	the	conflict	between	citizens	by	offering	a	stable	decision,	but	[these	 disputes]	 delay	 the	 law	 continuously	 and	 force	 it	 into	metamorphoses”	 (Fischer-Lescano	 &	 Christensen,	 2005,	 p.	 230;	 my	translation).	 The	 decision	 taken	 has	 to	 be	 acceptable	 for	 society.	 For	that	 purpose,	 the	 judge	 has	 to	 be	 open	 towards	 law’s	 environment	consisting	 of	 other	 social	 subsystems	 such	 as	 economy,	 morality,	religion	and	 science.	However,	 she	has	 to	prevent	 that	one	or	more	of	these	 systems	 will	 dominate	 the	 law.19	 The	 deconstructivist	 systems-theoretical	 concept	 of	 decision	 is	 both	 pluralist	 and	 “extremely	formalistic”	 (Fischer-Lescano	 &	 Christensen,	 2005,	 p.	 236;	 my	translation).	 It	 aims	 at	 involving	 the	 law	 as	 an	 “empty	 signifier”	 in	 a	process	 of	 eternal	 semiosis	 which	 includes	 as	 much	 as	 possible	 the	excluded	alternative	meanings.	Because	 the	 judge	has	a	duty	 to	 justify	her	 decision,	 she	 has	 to	 offer	 reasons	 which	 make	 the	 decision	transparant	 and	 controllable	 and	 which	 explicitly	 leave	 room	 for	 a	different	 decision.	 By	 taking	 into	 account	 all	 arguments	 presented	 by	the	parties,	she	is	able	to	diminish	or	“relativize”	the	violent	character	of	the	 decision	 (Fischer-Lescano	 &	 Christensen,	 2005,	 p.	 232;	 my	translation).		
																																								 																																								 																																								 																							dass	 die	 Alternative	 eine	 ist	 (denn	 sonst	 wäre	 die	 Entscheidung	 keine	Entscheidung)	und	zugleich	keine	ist	(denn	sonst	wäre	die	Entscheidung	keine	Entscheidung)”	(Luhmann,	2000,	p.	134).	This	can	be	related	to	what	Agamben,	1998,	 p.	 18,	 calls	 the	 “relation	 of	 exception,”	 that	 is,	 “the	 extreme	 form	 of	relation	by	which	something	is	included	solely	through	its	exclusion”	which,	in	his	view,	characterizes	the	state	of	exception.	18	This	phrase	is	taken	from	Fischer-Lescano	&	Christensen,	2005,	p.	241.	19	Or,	 as	Fischer-Lescano	&	Christensen,	2005,	p.	237	 (my	 translation),	put	 it,	“to	instrumentalize	one-sidedly”	the	law.	
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652	 So	 it	 seems	 that	 in	 contemporary	 legal	 and	 social	 theory,	 the	concept	 of	 decision	 has	 not	 disappeared	 but	 is	 stripped	 from	 its	decisionist	connotations.	Increasingly,	decisionism	is	transformed	into	a	deliberative	approach	that	requires	from	the	judge	to	give	good	reasons	for	 her	 decision	 and	 to	 include	 somehow	 the	 viewpoints	 that	 she	 has	excluded	in	her	decision.			4.	THE	FINALITY	OF	DECISION		However,	at	 some	point	 the	discussion	has	 to	stop.	Although	decisions	in	 law	often	come	about	after	and	through	 lengthy	debate,	 they	aim	at	establishing	legal	closure.	The	law	offers	an	institutionalized	method	for	putting	 an	 end	 to	 legal	 discussions	 in	 society	 and	 in	 academia	 that,	 in	the	 absence	 of	 an	 ultimate	 authority	 that	 is	 entitled	 to	 speak	 the	 “last	word”,	may	continue	endlessly.	From	an	abstract	academic	perspective,	
sub	specie	aeternitates	so	to	speak,	this	“end”	may	appear,	a	temporary	halt	in	the	process	of	eternal	semiosis;	for	the	parties	involved	in	a	case	it	 is	 the	 final	 stop,	 if	 there	are	no	 legal	possibilities	 left	 to	 re-open	 the	debate.	 And	 this	 may	 be	 welcomed,	 since	 otherwise	 legal	 procedures	would	 go	 on	 forever.	 In	 order	 to	 achieve	 legal	 closure,	 the	 law	presupposes	authority	–	authority	that	does	not	owe	its	validity	to	good	reasons.	 According	 to	 Arendt	 (as	 quoted	 in	 section	 1),	 “authority	 is	incompatible	 with	 persuasion”20	 because,	 in	 her	 view,	 persuasion	involves	 argumentation	 which	 equals	 a	 deferral	 or	 suspension	 of	authority.	 Authority	 would	 become	 very	 volatile,	 when	 on	 every	occasion	it	would	depend	on	the	willingness	of	the	parties	to	accept	the	arguments	given	by	the	judge.21		The	 judge	 is	 not	 a	 participant	 in	 an	 ongoing	 discussion,	 as	followers	of	the	deliberative	approach	would	have	it,	but	an	instance	of	authority	that	determines,	by	means	of	the	law	and	in	a	legally	binding	way,	what	the	law	means	here	and	now,	for	the	case	at	hand.	The	judge’s	decision	aims,	as	the	early	Schmitt	indicated,	at	providing	“legal	clarity”.	Violence	cannot	be	avoided,	because	alternative	decisions	are	excluded,	at	 least	 in	 this	 case.	However,	 this	does	not	mean	 that	 the	 judge	as	an	instance	of	authority	has	to	take	way	doubt	in	an	authoritarian	way,	as	the	 later	 Schmitt	 argued.22	 On	 the	 contrary,	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 expect	that	 she	 gives	 reasons	 for	 her	 decision.	 The	 justification	 given	 by	 the																																									 																					20	On	Arendt’s	view	of	authority,	see	Honig,	1993,	chapter	4.	21	 As	 Oakeshott,	 1999,	 p.	 149,	 argues,	 the	 Rule	 of	 Law	 is	 based	 on	 “the	recognition	of	the	authenticity	of	the	law,”	independent	of	its	content.	22	The	two	prior	references	can	be	found	in	section	2.	
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judge	 cannot	 deprive	 the	 decision	 of	 its	 violent	 character	 though	 (or	reduce	 the	 violence,	 as	 Fischer-Lescano	 &	 Christensen	 suggest):	notwithstanding	 all	 considerations	 and	 caveats,	 ultimately	 legal	consequences	will	 be	 attached	 to	 the	 decision.	 Robert	 Cover,	 1995,	 p.	203,	 expresses	 the	 relation	 between	 legal	 interpretation	 and	 violence	very	clearly:	“Legal	interpretive	acts	signal	and	occasion	the	imposition	of	violence	upon	others:	A	judge	articulates	her	understanding	of	a	text,	and	as	a	result,	somebody	loses	his	freedom,	his	property,	his	children,	even	his	life.”	As	indicated	earlier,	every	application	of	a	legal	norm	involves	to	a	greater	or	lesser	extent	freedom.	Therefore,	it	can	be	expected	that	the	judge,	 when	 applying	 general	 norms	 to	 a	 specific	 case,	 demonstrates	that	 the	 interpretative	 choices	 made	 follow	 from	 a	 possible	 and	
defendable,	not	necessarily	the	‘one	right’	application	of	the	legal	norms	at	hand.	She	needs	to	justify	her	decision,	because	she	could	have	taken	a	 different	 decision	 (that	 is	 exactly	 why	 it	 is	 a	 decision).	 Strictly	speaking,	the	validity	of	 law	in	a	concrete	case	does	not	depend	on	the	size	 and	 quality	 of	 the	 justification;	 also	 short	 and	 poorly	 reasoned	rulings	 are	 legally	 binding	 for	 the	 parties	 involved	 (as	 long	 as	 the	decision	 is	 not	 overruled	 by	 a	 higher	 court).	 However,	 for	 the	 social	acceptance	of	 the	general	 legal	order	 it	 is	 important	 that	 the	 law,	both	when	 it	 comes	 to	 its	 creation	 and	 its	 application,	manifests	 itself	 as	 a	“product	 of	 reflexive	 intelligence.”23	 In	 the	 justification,	 the	 different	opinions	of	the	parties	involved	must	be	reflected,	so	they	are	and	that	their	case	is	taken	seriously.	Moreover,	other	judges	who	have	to	take	a	decision	in	the	same	or	a	similar	case	must	have	access	to	the	relevant	considerations	 of	 the	 judge.	 In	 my	 view,	 the	 judge	 does	 not	 have	 to	address	 every	 argument	 that	 has	 been	 put	 forward	 in	 the	 social	 or	academic	debate	on	the	issue	at	hand	or	to	balance	extensively	the	pros	and	 cons	 of	 every	 solution	 thinkable.	 Moreover,	 I	 would	 be	 very	cautious	with	 including	 the	 excluded,	 as	 some	authors	have	 suggested	(see	section	3).	The	 judge	should,	of	course,	 justify	why	a	certain	view	point,	argument	or	solution	is	excluded,	though	not	in	order	to	keep	the	possibility	 of	 a	 different	 decision	 open	 (in	 the	 line	 of	 Luhmann	 and	Fischer-Lescano	&	 Christensen),	 but	 to	 achieve	 legal	 closure,	 however	temporarily	 or	 provisionally.	 The	 justification	 should	 demonstrate	convincingly	 and	 forcefully	 why	 the	 judge	 has	 favoured	 this	 decision	over	other	possible	decisions.		I	would	therefore	like	to	argue	for	a	justification	that	is	concise,	consistent	and	modest	in	that	it	presents	itself,	not	as	the	right	answer	(that	may	not	exist),	but	as	a	possible	right	answer.	The	faculty	of	reason																																									 																					23	Oakeshott,	1999,	p.	256,	borrows	this	notion	from	Hegel.	
Bart	van	Klink		
	
654	will	always	find	reasons	to	question	the	 judge’s	decision.	Undoubtedly,	from	 some	 normative	 point	 of	 view,	 other	 decisions	will	 appear	 to	 be	better	 or	 better	 justified.	 For	 lack	 of	 generally	 shared	 values,24	 we	continue	to	argue	about	the	meaning	of	the	norms	involved,	the	values	at	stake	and	their	internal	relation.	But	at	a	certain	point	the	case	has	to	be	closed.	What	can	be	required	in	any	case,	is	that	the	judge	shows	that	her	ruling	is	based	on	a	possible	application	of	the	relevant	legal	norms,	that	 it	 connects	 to	 earlier	 applications	of	 these	norms	by	other	 judges	and	is	supported	by	the	legal	system	as	whole,	 its	underlying	aims	and	values	 and	 its	 historical	 development	 (that	 is,	 in	 Gadamer’s	 terms,	 its	effective	 history25).	 As	 Odo	 Marquard,	 2003,	 p.	 78	 (my	 translation)	states,	 “the	 burden	 of	 proof	 is	 on	 the	 one	 who	 changes	 something.”	When	 deciding	 a	 case,	 the	 judge	 can	 appeal	 to	 the	 variety	 of	 topoi	 or	common	places,	accepted	by	many	people	or	the	wise,	that	can	be	found	in	the	various	subsystems	of	society.26	Topoi,	such	as	equality	or	equity,	can	give	 some	normative	orientation	when	difficult	 choices	have	 to	be	made,	 but	 they	 can	 never	 dictate	 a	 specific	 outcome.	Which	 topoi	 are	applicable	in	a	concrete	case	and	how	they	have	to	be	applied,	cannot	be	derived	from	the	topoi	themselves.	When	the	cognitive	operations	have	been	 carried	 out,	 the	moment	 of	 choice	 has	 come.	Ultimately,	 it	 is	 the	judge	who	has	to	cut	the	knot.			REFERENCES		Agamben,	G.	(1998).	Homo	sacer.	Sovereign	power	and	bare	life	(translated	by	D.	Heller-Roazen).	Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press.	Arendt,	H.	(2006).	Between	past	and	future.	Eight	exercises	in	political	thought.	New	York:	Penguin	Books.	Cover,	R.	(1995).	Violence	and	the	word.	In	M.	Minow,	M.	Ryan	&	A.	Sarat	(Eds.),	
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